Why Portuguese Coaches Keep Winning the Copa Libertadores

Portuguese coaches have guided four of the last seven Copa Libertadores winners, while Abel Ferreira and Leonardo Jardim remain in contention for the 2026 title. Yet the real lesson is not that one Portuguese system has conquered South America. Recent champions have won through contrasting formations, pressing strategies, build-up structures and game models. For the modern head coach, the Libertadores provides a powerful lesson: tactical identity matters, but tactical flexibility can decide championships.

The Copa Libertadores has developed a significant Portuguese influence. Since 2019, Jorge Jesus, Abel Ferreira and Artur Jorge have collectively delivered four titles for Flamengo, Palmeiras and Botafogo. Jesus transformed Flamengo into the champions of 2019, Ferreira led Palmeiras to consecutive titles in 2020 and 2021, and Artur Jorge guided Botafogo to their first Libertadores success in 2024. In 2026, Ferreira is again among the final eight with Palmeiras, while Leonardo Jardim is attempting to defend Flamengo’s 2025 title after taking charge of the Brazilian club earlier this year.

Those results naturally invite discussion about a Portuguese coaching methodology, but reducing this period of success to one system or tactical philosophy misses the most important lesson. These winning teams have actually demonstrated considerable tactical variation. Some have dominated possession and pressed aggressively, others have accepted periods without the ball, some have attacked with traditional width, others have overloaded central areas, and some have changed defensive structure dramatically according to the opponent or game state.

The recent history of the competition is therefore evidence against the idea that there is one formation capable of winning elite soccer consistently. The stronger conclusion is that successful head coaches need clearly defined principles while remaining flexible about the structures used to deliver them.

That distinction between principles and formations is fundamental to modern coaching. A formation describes where players might begin. A game model explains how they are expected to behave. The best coaches understand that a 4-2-3-1 can attack like a 3-2-5, defend like a 4-4-2 and press differently again depending on the opponent. In another match, the same coach may decide that a back three, narrow diamond or deeper block provides a better route to the same objective.

This is why ISSPF’s analysis of soccer tactics, periodisation and game model development places such importance on connecting playing principles to training rather than defining a team solely through its numerical formation. The recent Libertadores winners provide some of the clearest practical examples of why that distinction matters.

From Jorge Jesus to Abel Ferreira – Different Systems, Different Ways to Win

Jorge Jesus opened the recent Portuguese coaching cycle at Flamengo in 2019, but his championship team provides an important starting point because its identity was considerably more aggressive than some of the Palmeiras sides that followed.

Flamengo entered the 2019 final against River Plate from a 4-2-3-1 base structure, while defensive phases frequently became a 4-4-2. Jesus encouraged his team to construct from the goalkeeper, create central numerical superiority and commit the full-backs aggressively into higher areas. Willian Arão provided balance from midfield and could drop deeper during build-up, while Flamengo’s attacking players rotated through central and half-space positions around Gabriel Barbosa and Bruno Henrique.

The most recognisable part of the model was not simply the shape. It was the intention. Flamengo wanted to dominate the opponent, regain possession rapidly and maintain attacking pressure high up the pitch. Their defensive transition was aggressive, their counter-pressing attempted to prevent opponents escaping, and their attacking structure was designed to place numbers around the penalty area. Jesus could also switch between a 4-2-3-1, conventional 4-4-2 and diamond-shaped midfield depending on the match. This is an important detail for developing coaches. He had an identifiable attacking philosophy but did not require one rigid formation to express it.

Flamengo’s dramatic late victory over River Plate consequently represented one version of Libertadores success: high tactical ambition, attacking numbers, advanced full-backs, aggressive pressing and a willingness to control possession. One year later, Abel Ferreira won the same competition with a very different emphasis.

Palmeiras started the 2020 final against Santos from a 4-2-3-1. The match itself was much more controlled and cautious than Flamengo’s final a year earlier. Ferreira prepared different mechanisms for pressing Santos, operating in a middle block and protecting the penalty area against the threat of inverted wide players such as Marinho and Yeferson Soteldo.

In possession, Palmeiras could construct patiently but were also comfortable playing forward more directly. Luiz Adriano provided an important reference higher up the pitch, while Ferreira used midfield positioning and wide overloads to escape pressure rather than demanding that every attacking sequence develop through prolonged possession.

Palmeiras ultimately won 1-0 through Breno Lopes’ stoppage-time header. The result was significant tactically because it demonstrated that Ferreira was comfortable winning through control and game management rather than attempting to reproduce the more expansive Flamengo model that had lifted the trophy previously. The contrast should interest coaches. Both teams had a game model. Both were organised. Both had clear attacking and defensive principles. Yet the route to the trophy was different.

Ferreira then provided perhaps the strongest evidence of tactical flexibility when Palmeiras retained the Libertadores in 2021.

Instead of simply repeating the 4-2-3-1 that had beaten Santos, Ferreira prepared a different structure against Flamengo. Palmeiras used a 3-4-3 in possession, with Rony leading the attack and the players underneath him moving into central positions. Ferreira sought to create a box of four attacking players around Flamengo’s midfield and defensive lines, while the wing-backs provided the width required to stretch the opponent.

Without the ball, however, Palmeiras did not simply remain in a back five. The structure could reorganise into a defensive line of four, with specific individual responsibilities designed around Flamengo’s threats. Ferreira also prepared several different build-up routes rather than insisting on one predictable first-phase pattern. The tactical importance of that final should not be underestimated. The same head coach won consecutive Libertadores titles using substantially different structures according to the opponent and the players available. That is flexible coaching.

It does not mean Ferreira abandoned his philosophy between 2020 and 2021. His Palmeiras sides remained competitive, compact, disciplined and comfortable attacking directly when the situation demanded it. What changed was the tactical architecture around those principles. For coaches attempting to develop their own methodology, this is the important distinction explored in ISSPF’s Game Model Development in Soccer. A coach should be able to explain the behaviours that define the team without becoming permanently attached to one formation.

If changing from a back four to a back three causes the entire playing philosophy to disappear, the team probably has a formation rather than a developed game model.

Libertadores Champions Show There Is More Than One Tactical Route to Success

The strongest argument for tactical flexibility becomes even clearer when Portuguese coaches are placed alongside the other recent Libertadores-winning managers.

Dorival Júnior’s Flamengo won the 2022 competition through another tactical configuration. His side frequently operated from a narrow 4-3-1-2, with Giorgian de Arrascaeta behind Pedro and Gabriel Barbosa. Rather than creating attacking width predominantly through conventional wingers, Flamengo concentrated significant quality through central and interior areas, while the full-backs were given greater responsibility for stretching the pitch.

The midfield structure helped Flamengo generate numerical superiority inside, while the movements of the forwards and attacking midfielders created combinations close to goal. It was tactically different from Jesus’ 2019 Flamengo despite many of the same principles of technical quality and attacking control remaining important to the club. In 2023, Fernando Diniz then won Fluminense’s first Libertadores with a model that challenged many conventional ideas about positional structure.

Fluminense often started from what could nominally be described as a 4-2-3-1, but the formation tells very little of the real story. Diniz encouraged constant movement, short passing relationships and large numbers of players gathering around the ball. Rather than ensuring that every player permanently occupied a predetermined zone, Fluminense frequently overloaded one side of the pitch and created combinations through proximity.

André could drop between the centre-backs during build-up, Marcelo could move into unconventional interior positions, and Paulo Henrique Ganso operated as the creative reference within a team comfortable attracting opposition pressure before combining through it. The approach became associated with relational or anti-positional soccer because player relationships and proximity to the ball were frequently prioritised over maintaining traditional positional occupation across the width of the pitch.

Fluminense’s victory therefore provided another important coaching lesson. A Libertadores-winning team did not need to resemble Palmeiras, Jesus’ Flamengo or the European positional-game models that were influencing elite soccer elsewhere. Identity could emerge through a fundamentally different interpretation of attacking organisation.

ISSPF’s feature on tactical analysis and the key phases of soccer is particularly relevant here because formations should always be interpreted through actual behaviour. Coaches need to analyse what the team does during build-up, progression, creation, defensive organisation and both transitions rather than assuming the starting formation adequately describes how a team plays. The 2024 final provided perhaps the most extreme demonstration of all.

Artur Jorge’s Botafogo generally developed through a fluid 4-2-3-1 or 4-4-2. Their attacking football was dynamic and vertical, with wide players capable of moving inside, a midfielder dropping deeper to assist the first phase and technically strong attackers positioned to exploit the space created once opposition pressure had been beaten.

Botafogo began the final against Atlético Mineiro in a 4-2-3-1, with Gregore and Marlon Freitas operating as the double pivot behind Luiz Henrique, Jefferson Savarino, Thiago Almada and Igor Jesus. Within approximately 30 seconds, the original tactical plan was effectively destroyed.

At that point, the final became an extraordinary test of coaching adaptability. Artur Jorge could no longer rely on the attacking structure that had taken Botafogo through the competition. With ten men, Botafogo dropped into extremely compact defensive structures that at different moments resembled a 5-3-1 and even a 6-3-0. Wide attacking players recovered all the way into the defensive line, while the team protected central areas and forced Atlético Mineiro to find solutions against a deep and heavily populated block. Botafogo still found moments to attack and eventually won 3-1.

That performance may offer the clearest lesson in this entire recent history. Artur Jorge had built an attacking team, but winning the final required him to coach almost the opposite match. He did not protect his preferred structure at the expense of the result. He recognised that the game had changed and adapted immediately. For a head coach, flexibility sometimes means changing a system during the season. In other situations, it means changing within a match. Occasionally, as Botafogo demonstrated, the coach may have seconds rather than weeks to solve the problem.

The Libertadores has therefore recently been won through a 4-2-3-1 that became a 4-4-2, a controlled 4-2-3-1, a 3-4-3 capable of becoming a back four, a narrow 4-3-1-2, a fluid relational 4-2-3-1 and, in the most extreme circumstances, a ten-man low block that changed between five- and six-player defensive lines. There is no championship formation. There are championship decisions.

What Tactical Flexibility Really Means for a Modern Head Coach

The lesson should not be that coaches need to change formation every week. Constant tactical change without clear principles can create confusion just as easily as excessive rigidity can create predictability. Flexible coaching begins with knowing what should not change. A coach may decide that the team will always attempt to defend compactly, react aggressively after losing possession, create numerical superiority around the ball and attack space quickly once pressure has been broken. Those are principles. Whether the players begin from a 4-3-3, 4-2-3-1 or 3-4-3 is a structural decision used to help deliver those principles.

The first level of flexibility therefore involves the players. Coaches should shape the game model around the strongest characteristics available rather than forcing every squad into a preferred diagram. Dorival’s narrow Flamengo structure maximised central creativity and two dangerous forwards. Diniz gave technical players the freedom to combine through proximity. Ferreira repeatedly changed the organisation around the profiles he had available.

The second level concerns the opponent. Palmeiras’ 2021 final illustrates how detailed opponent analysis can alter the structure without destroying the team’s identity. Ferreira did not suddenly become another coach because Flamengo required a different tactical plan. He adjusted the solution.

This balance between opponent analysis and maintaining a recognisable playing identity is also central to ISSPF’s discussion of creating a modern team-based training model. Training should prepare players to recognise tactical problems rather than merely rehearse fixed patterns that work only when an opponent behaves as expected.

The third level is the game state. A team drawing 0-0 may need something different from a team protecting a lead with twelve minutes remaining. A coach chasing the game may change the number of players occupying the last line, while a coach reduced to ten players may need an entirely new defensive organisation.

Artur Jorge’s response in the 2024 final represents the extreme version, but coaches face smaller versions of the same decision every week. The best tactical plan can become irrelevant after an early goal, injury, red card or unexpected opposition change. Players therefore need to understand more than Plan A. This does not mean creating five completely different playing models. It means educating players to recognise what changes and what remains constant when the structure is adjusted.

The fourth level is competition context. Libertadores knockout soccer is different from the regular domestic league. Two-leg ties involve score management, travel, contrasting stadium environments and tactical decisions influenced by the first result. A head coach might need to attack one leg aggressively and control another more conservatively.

Palmeiras’ current quarter-final against Liga de Quito provides a particularly interesting example. Ferreira’s side face the same opponent that beat Palmeiras 3-0 in Quito in the 2025 semi-final before Palmeiras produced a remarkable 4-0 response in São Paulo. That previous tie demonstrates how dramatically the tactical and emotional requirements of a two-legged contest can change between matches.

Flamengo face a different challenge against Independiente del Valle, with Leonardo Jardim attempting to guide the defending champions through a quarter-final involving a first leg in Quito and a return at the Maracanã. Jardim therefore becomes the latest Portuguese coach required to demonstrate that methodology and adaptability can operate together.

The fifth level is training flexibility. Tactical variation cannot exist only inside the coach’s head. Players have to experience alternative structures during the training process.

This is why managing in-season tactical and physiological periodisation becomes so important. In congested competitive periods, the coach has limited time to introduce tactical adjustments. Sessions must therefore reproduce the relevant decisions efficiently without overwhelming players physically or cognitively.

The best head coaches develop adaptable players rather than constantly giving players new instructions.

That difference is critical.

If players understand only where the coach has told them to stand, a tactical change can create confusion. If they understand why the team wants to create an overload, protect central space, establish width or manipulate the opposition press, they can apply those concepts within several different structures. This is ultimately what tactical intelligence looks like.

It is also why modern coaching increasingly involves creating a learning environment rather than simply delivering information. ISSPF’s feature on creating coaching environments for learning highlights the importance of developing players capable of understanding problems, making decisions and taking responsibility within the wider game model. The coach still provides the framework. The players have to operate inside it.

Recent Libertadores history demonstrates this repeatedly. Jesus’ Flamengo did not win because 4-2-3-1 is the best formation. Ferreira did not retain the trophy because 3-4-3 replaced it as the new answer. Dorival did not prove that a narrow diamond is superior, while Diniz did not prove every team should abandon positional occupation. Artur Jorge certainly did not plan to win a final defending in 5-3-1 and 6-3-0 structures with ten players. They won because their teams understood the problem they were trying to solve. That is the central difference between having a tactical system and being a tactically flexible head coach.

As the 2026 Copa Libertadores enters its quarter-finals, Abel Ferreira and Leonardo Jardim have another opportunity to extend Portuguese coaching’s remarkable recent influence over South America’s biggest club competition. Whatever happens next, the previous seven years have already produced an important lesson for coaches. The Libertadores has not rewarded one formation. It has rewarded coaches who combine identity with adaptability, tactical detail with player quality, and strong principles with the courage to change the structure when the game demands something different.

For coaches exploring how these ideas can be applied to their own teams, ISSPF’s Game Model Development in Soccer provides further insight into connecting playing principles with practical training behaviour, while the recent ISSPF News feature Replacing Pep Guardiola: The Coaching Challenge Facing Enzo Maresca at Manchester City examines a different version of the same challenge: how a head coach can evolve a successful tactical identity without becoming trapped by the system that came before.

Across Europe and South America, the message is increasingly similar. The modern head coach needs a philosophy strong enough to give the team identity, but flexible enough to survive the changing problems that elite soccer continually creates.